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Abstract in English 
In the Dutch social health insurance scheme, health plans operate in a managed competition 
framework. Essential features of this framework are risk adjustment, open enrolment and 
community rating. The objective is to study how health plans determine their community rated 
premiums. Using a panel data set for all health plans operating in the Dutch social health 
insurance market over the period 1996-2004, we estimate a premium model to determine which 
factors explain the price setting behaviour of health plans. Our empirical results indicate that 
competition did not play a major role in premium setting by health plans. We find that financial 
stability rather than profit maximisation offers the best explanation for health plan pricing 
behaviour. The forecast of next year’s health-care expenditure by the government and the 
adjusted forecast by the insurers’ association play a major role in health plans’ pricing 
decisions. The introduction of a national health insurance scheme in 2006 urged all citizens to 
reconsider their health plan choice. The threat of losing customers had a profound impact on 
health plans’ pricing behaviour. In sharp contrast to the period 1996-2005, in 2006 competition 
seems to play a dominant role in insurers’ pricing decisions. Whether this will be a temporary 
or a lasting phenomenon is hard to predict. 
Key words: Managed competition, Community rating, Health insurance, Health-plan choice  
JEL code: I11, I18, L11, D41 
Abstract in Dutch 
Sinds 1996 bestaat er voor verzekeraars een systeem van gereguleerde concurrentie op de 
ziekenfondsmarkt. Voor de periode 1996-2004 wordt op basis van paneldata op 
ziekenfondsniveau onderzocht hoe de premiestelling van ziekenfondsen kan worden verklaard. 
Uit de schattingen volgt dat concurrentie een ondergeschikte rol speelde bij de premiestelling 
door ziekenfondsen. Het prijszettinggedrag van ziekenfondsen lijkt veel meer te worden 
beïnvloed door het streven naar een gezonde financiële positie dan door winstmaximalisatie. De 
voorspelling van de totale zorguitgaven door de overheid, en de aanpassing van die voorspelling 
door Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN), lijken een belangrijke rol te spelen in de premiestelling 
van individuele ziekenfondsen. De invoering van de Zorgverzekeringswet in 2006 heeft geleid 
tot een radicaal verschillende keuzesituatie voor alle verzekerden. De reële dreiging van een 
verlies aan verzekerden blijkt van grote invloed op de premiestelling van zorgverzekeraars. In 
scherp contrast met de periode 1996-2005, lijkt concurrentie een dominante rol te spelen bij de 
premiestelling. Of dit een tijdelijk of blijvend fenomeen is, valt nog moeilijk te voorspellen. 
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Summary 
In the Dutch social health insurance scheme, health plans operate in a managed competition 
framework. Essential features of this framework are risk adjustment, open enrolment and 
community rating. An important condition for managed competition is that price competition 
sufficiently motivates health plans to improve the efficiency of health care. The purpose of this 
paper is to study whether the precondition of sufficient price competition is met. 
Previous studies provide evidence that competition is likely to be weak because of low price 
sensitivity of consumers. If competition would not be sufficient to drive premiums down to the 
competitive level, the question becomes how health plans determine the community rated 
premiums. For example, do they raise premiums to increase profits or do they charge premiums 
that are just sufficient to cover average cost?  
We studied health plans’ pricing behaviour by constructing a panel data set including 
information on health insurer characteristics, premium levels and financial performance for all 
health plans operating in the Dutch social insurance market over the period 1996-2004. Using 
these panel data, we estimate a premium model to determine which factors explain the price 
setting behaviour of health plans.  
Our empirical results indicate that competition did not play a major role in premium setting 
by health plans. Despite the lack of effective competition, premiums did not converge towards 
the monopoly level. Instead, we observe a substantial and persistent premium variation, while in 
most years the average premium is only somewhat higher than the “administrative premium” as 
yearly set by the government. The administrative premium is about the break-even price for an 
average health plan if the government’s forecast of total health care and administrative 
expenditures is correct. The most important drivers for health plans’ pricing behaviour appeared 
to be the legally specified minimum and maximum levels of financial reserves. The forecasts of 
next year’s health care expenditure by the government, and the adjustment of this forecast by 
the insurers’ association, play a major role in health plans’ pricing decisions.  
In 2006, all Dutch citizens were faced with a radical change in choice setting due to a major 
reform of the health insurance system. Health insurers anticipated that many customers would 
reconsider their health plan choice. The threat of a substantial loss of customers had a profound 
impact on health plans’ pricing behaviour. Most health plans charged substantially lower 
premiums than forecasted by the government. Next to increased competition, this pricing 
behaviour may also be explained by the government’s assurance that in 2006 insurers would be 
largely compensated if risk-adjusted payments would be insufficient to cover actual costs. This 
implied that the premium forecast by the government – which is used to determine the total 
amount of risk-adjusted payments – could serve as a reliable benchmark for setting premiums.  
In sharp contrast to the period 1996-2005, however, competition seems to play a dominant role 
in pricing decisions by health insurers in 2006. Whether this will be a temporary or lasting 
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1  Introduction 
During the 1990s, the social health insurance scheme of the Netherlands was profoundly 
reformed by the introduction of managed competition among non-profit social health plans 
(sickness funds, health insurers or health insurance carriers).
1 Health plans were allowed to 
compete on price for a legally standardised basic benefits package. To preserve risk solidarity, 
health plans were obliged to charge a community rated premium. A system of risk-adjusted 
premium subsidies was introduced to compensate health insurers for enrolees with predictable 
high medical expenses. Freedom of choice of health plans was introduced by requiring health 
plans to accept all eligible applicants during annual open enrolment periods. Furthermore, the 
legal entry barriers to the social health plan market were largely removed and several new 
health plans were permitted to enter the market. Finally, to provide health plans with the 
opportunity to manage care in 1992 the government abolished the obligation for health plans to 
contract with any willing provider, except for inpatient care institutions. In 2006 the scope of 
managed competition model was broadened from about two thirds to the entire population by 
the introduction of a new Health Insurance Act. Since then former social health plans and 
former private indemnity insurers (mutual as well as for-profit companies) have to compete in 
providing basic health insurance coverage. The new Health Insurance Act creates much more 
opportunities to health insurers to offer preferred provider arrangements and to manage care. 
The primary reason of the introduction of price competition and freedom of choice of health 
plans was to increase the incentives for health plans to improve the efficiency of health care. 
Prior to the reforms in the 1990s health plans were completely retrospectively reimbursed for 
the medical expenses of their enrolees and consequently had no stake in a more efficient 
provision of medical care.  
Since several other countries (e.g. Germany and Switzerland) followed the Netherlands by 
introducing managed competition in their social health insurance schemes, an important 
question is whether the model works as intended. A crucial precondition for this is that price 
competition sufficiently motivates health plans to improve efficiency. The purpose of this paper 
is to investigate whether the precondition of sufficient price competition is met. Therefore, we 
seek to explain the pricing behaviour of health plans. First, we will identify several factors that 
might explain price setting behaviour of health plans. Then, we will describe the panel data set 
that was constructed for all health plans over the period 1996-2004. Next we present the 
estimation results of several premium models, revealing which factors most likely explain the 
observed price setting behaviour. We will discuss two factors that are particularly interesting: 
the role of competition and the role of the health care expenditure forecasts by the health 
 
1 Non-profit does not imply that a health plan is not allowed to generate any profits (surpluses). The profits of a non-profit 
plan can be used to improve the organisation, to build up reserve capital or to lower future premiums, but may not be 
distributed to shareholders as is the case of for-profit plans.    10 
insurers association (ZN). Finally, we will discuss the impact on price setting behaviour after 
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2  Potential determinants of pricing behaviour 
Until 2006, all health plans offering basic social health insurance were required to be non-profit 
mutual companies, implying that they were not allowed to distribute surpluses to shareholders.  
In a market where all competitors are non-profit, pricing behaviour may not be driven by profit 
maximisation. This may have important implications if the market is not perfectly competitive 
and competitors have some latitude to set prices above the competitive level. Indeed, previous 
research findings provide evidence that competition in the Dutch social health insurance market 
is likely to be weak because of the low price sensitivity of consumers (Schut and Hassink 2002; 
Schut, Greβ and Wasem 2003; Van Dijk et al. 2006). 
If competition is not sufficient to drive premiums down to the competitive level, the 
question becomes how health plans determine the community rated premiums. Do they raise 
premiums to increase profits or do they charge premiums that are just sufficient to cover 
average cost? Are there persisting differences among health plans in costs and premiums over 
time? Do different health plans follow different pricing strategies? To answer these questions 
we investigate what factors could have explained pricing decisions by health plans over the 
period 1996-2004. We distinguish the following potential determinants. 
Cost of providing insurance coverage 
First, pricing decisions are likely to be based on the cost of providing insurance coverage. All 
health plans were required by law to offer the same standardised benefits package. Moreover, 
although health plans had some room for selective contracting and managing care they hardly 
used these opportunities (Lieverdink, 2001, CTZ 2004a, 2004b, 2005).
2  Hence, health plans 
offered essentially the same insurance product. The cost of providing this product may vary 
across health plans for two reasons. First, the risk profile of the insured population may differ. 
Although these differences were substantially reduced by the system of risk-adjusted premium 
subsidies, they were not completely equalised. Insofar differences in risk profile were not 
compensated by the risk-adjustment system health plans faced different costs of providing basic 
coverage (see also Douven, 2004). A second potential source of cost variations are differences 
in administrative expenses. Administrative expenses may vary because of differences in service 
level, marketing expenses or administrative efficiency. However, since health plans are also 
involved in providing long term care and supplementary insurance the administrative expenses 
of providing basic insurance may not reflect the true cost. While health plans are not put on risk 
for medical long term care expenses, they are responsible for the administrative expenses. All 
administrative expenses that exceed the budget for providing long term care feed through to a 
health plans’ financial reserves and might result in higher premiums (CTZ, 2000). Although 
 
2 In recent years, most advances in managing care are made in contracting maternity care (CTZ 2005) Selective contracting 
with general practitioners and obstetricians has not been used due to a shortage of practitioners and contractual 
arrangements about quality of care were still in its infancy (CTZ 2004a) .    12 
basic and supplementary health insurance are formally separated and offered by different legal 
entities, both entities are always part of the same company. More than 90 percent of health plan 
enrolees buy supplementary health insurance coverage and almost all of them (98 percent) from 
the same company. Due to the joint marketing and administration of basic and supplementary 
insurance, companies can easily shift administrative costs from basic to supplementary health 
insurance (and vice versa).
3 Therefore, the community rated premium of basic insurance may 
not only depend on the administrative expenses of providing basic health care insurance, but 
also on the administrative expenses for supplementary and long term care insurance.  
Health plans’ objectives 
Second, pricing decisions by health plans are likely to be influenced by the goals they pursue. 
All health plans are mutual companies and are legally prohibited to distribute profits to 
shareholders. Because there are no residual claimants, health plans’ objectives may differ from 
profit maximisation.
4 For instance, small independent regionally based health plans often 
propagate their adherence to “social objectives”, while large health plans that are part of a large 
insurance holding company may be more profit-oriented, reflecting the overall goals and 
strategies of the holding company. New entrants, on the other hand, may be primarily interested 
in gaining market share rather than making profit. 
Prices of closest competitors 
A third potential determinant that is likely to influence pricing behaviour is the level of 
competition and in particular the price setting behaviour of closest competitors. Health plans’ 
incentive to cut premiums comes from the expectation of increased sales. A health plan that cuts 
premiums anticipates that some consumers will respond by switching from rival plans.
5 If a 
sufficient number of consumers are inclined to search for lower-priced health plans, the 
opportunities for health plans to raise community-rated premiums will be effectively 
constrained. A survey investigating consumer choice of health plan, however, revealed that 
consumers tend to stick with a once chosen health plan for a long time (Laske-Aldershof et al. 
2003). This is consistent with empirical findings in the US that buyers of insurance tend to have 
a strong preference for maintaining the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
Moreover, the same survey indicates that Dutch consumers have a clear preference for the 
 
3 The problem of cost shifting has been recognized by the Health Insurance Authority (CTZ), which is charged with the 
supervision of the social health insurance schemes (CTZ 2002). The CTZ finds evidence of a large variation between 
companies in the ratio of administrative costs of basic and supplementary health insurance and concludes that accounting 
rules to allocate administrative costs are often unclear, particularly in case health plans belong to a large holding company. 
4 Frech (1996) argues that there is ample evidence that Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, being the largest non-profit health 
insurers in the US, pursue different objectives than commercial insurers even though they operate in the same market. In 
the Dutch health plan market until 2006 the potential for diverging market conduct was even larger than in the US since all 
health plans were non-profit and therefore spill over effects from for-profit firms were absent. 
5 Usually, by charging a lower price sellers can also increase sales because buyers will buy more and new buyers will be 
attracted to the market. Health plans do not have this option, however, since coverage is standardised and mandatory for a 
legally defined population.   13 
largest or most well-known health plan that is located in their region of residence. Hence, health 
plans may be particularly sensitive to the pricing behaviour of the geographically closest 
competitors, despite that all but one have extended their statutory working area to the entire 
country (implying that they have to accept all Dutch applicants). 
Level of price competition in the supplementary health insurance market 
Since health plans often sell basic and supplementary health insurance as a combined product, 
the extent of competition in the supplementary health insurance market may have an impact on 
pricing behaviour in the basic health insurance market. Since supplementary health insurance 
products are much more heterogeneous than standardised basic coverage, consumer search costs 
are much higher, raising the opportunity for health plans to set supracompetitive prices. Health 
plans may use these profits to cross subsidise basic insurance if the basic insurance market is 
more competitive. 
Price signals 
Pricing behaviour may also be influenced by price signals set by the government and the 
insurers’ interest association (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland). Each year the government makes a 
forecast of next year’s total health care expenditure covered by health plans to determine the 
total amount of  risk-adjusted premium subsidies and the so-called “administrative premium”. 
The administrative premium is a fixed amount per individual that is not compensated for by 
risk-adjusted subsidy. If the government’s forecast is correct an average health plan would have 
to charge the administrative premium to their enrolees in order to break even. Once the 
administrative premium is determined by the government, the insurers’ interest association 
recalculates governments’ forecast of health care expenditures which can be used by health 
plans to assess whether the administrative premium really reflects the average break-even price. 
Both forecasts may serve as a focal point for health plans’ premium decisions.  
Focal points may be very useful for health plans to reduce forecasting errors in predicting 
health care cost inflation and to reduce uncertainty about rivals’ behaviour. Both unanticipated 
fluctuations in health care expenses – often associated with shocks caused by health policy 
changes – and unpredictable pricing strategies by competitors appear to be the driving forces 
behind the persisting underwriting cycles (periodic wide swings in premiums and profitability) 
often observed in health insurance markets (Grossman and Ginsburg 2004). Price signals that 
serve as focal points may mitigate underwriting cycles if the signal is correct, but may also 
reinforce underwriting cycles if price signals are distorted by substantial forecasting errors.  
On the downside, release of information by the government and the insurers’ interest 
association about focal points can facilitate tacit collusion. Health plans that want to coordinate 
premiums will find it easier to set a community rated premium on which they can implicitly 
agree. Hence, focal prices may lead to higher-than-competitive prices.    14 
Financial reserves 
The magnitude of the financial reserves constitutes another potential determinant of health 
plans’ pricing behaviour. Differences in accumulated reserves may lead to different pricing 
strategies. For instance, health plans with large financial reserves may lower premiums to gain 
market share at the expense of profitability, while health plans with limited financial reserves 
may opt for high premiums to regain a sound solvency position. Grossman and Ginsburg (2004) 
explain that the accumulation and subsequent spending down of financial reserves by the non-
profit Blues plans – as opposed to commercial insurers who had to distribute excess reserves to 
shareholders – helped to drive the underwriting cycle.  
In the Netherlands government regulations on financial reserves may restrict price setting 
behaviour by health plans. The government not only requires that financial reserves should meet 
at least a certain minimum solvency margin, but since 2001 also that financial reserves do not 
exceed a certain maximum level. Hence, health plans close to the minimum level may be forced 
to raise premiums, while the opposite holds for health plans close to the maximum level. 
Obviously, if the maximum reserve requirement would be a binding constraint for a substantial 
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3  Data and descriptive statistics 
In order to estimate the effect of the potential determinants of health plan pricing behaviour on 
actual premiums, we constructed an unbalanced panel of 32 social health plans over the period 
1996-2004. The year 1996 was chosen as starting year because, since then, health plans have 
been increasingly put at risk for the medical expenses of their enrolees and began to set 
different out-of-pocket premiums. The panel is unbalanced since the number of health plans 
fluctuated over time due to mergers and entry of new health plans. 
Basic features of the social insurance market are presented in table 3.1. Over the entire period 
the number of health plans decreased, particularly during the first years of the new Millennium. 
After an initial increase, the number of small health plans seems to have decreased as well. 
Almost all health plans leaving during the sample period merged with other insurers, while new 
insurers entering started always with a relatively small population. The data show a clear trend 
of health plans becoming larger and the market becoming more concentrated. This is confirmed 
in the last row by the concentration measure HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschmann index), which shows 
an upward trend.
6 
Children under the age of eighteen are not required to pay out-of-pocket premiums. Since only 
adults pay an out-of-pocket premium we calculated cost and financial reserves also per 
“premium paying” (adult) enrolee. Dividing costs and financial reserves by the number of adult 
enrolees resulted in some cases in extreme outliers for very small health plans. We excluded 
therefore twenty-one annual observations from our sample of small health plans with a 
population smaller than 6000 adult enrolees. Health plans set their out-of-pocket premium for 
the next year at the end of the previous year. By setting their premium we assume that health 
plans use only information of past (or current) year(s). For a lot of variables, such as financial 
reserves and administrative costs, it is therefore sufficient to have only information until the end 
of 2003. 
Table 3.1  Number and size of health plans 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                   
Population size (millions)  9.8  9.9  9.9  9.9  10.3  10.3  10.2  10.1  10.2 
Total number of health plans  27  29  29  29  26  24  21  21  21 
Number of health plans leaving  0  0  2  0  3  2  4  0  0 
Number of health plans entering  1  2  2  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Health plans with population <10.000  3  5  6  6  2  1  0  0  n.a. 
Health plans with population < 50.000  5  7  8  8  6  5  4  4  n.a. 
Health plans with population < 100.000  6  8  10  10  7  6  6  6  n.a. 
Health plans with population > 500.000  7  7  8  8  9  9  7  7  n.a. 
Health plans with population > 800.000  2  2  3  3  4  4  6  5  n.a. 
HHI  622  622  663  663  707  711  893  886  n.a. 
 
 
6 The HHI is equal to the sum of the squared market shares of all health plans.   16 
3.1  Dependent variable: Out-of-pocket premiums 
Health plans get revenues from two different sources. Health plans receive money directly from 
the government, who collects this money through income-related taxes, and obtain money from 
charging community-rated out-of-pocket premiums (PCOM). The money from the government 
comprises the risk-adjusted capitation payments plus an administrative budget minus a fixed flat 
rate per adult enrolee, the administrative premium (PADM). An average health plan that charges 
an out-of-pocket premium equal to the administrative premium would break even if the 
government’s forecast of total medical and administrative expenses are correct. After the 
announcement of the administrative premium, the insurers’ association provides its own 
expenditure forecast, which can be used by health plans to calculate an adjusted administrative 
premium. We define PDIF as the difference between the official and adjusted administrative 
premium.  
Table 3.2 shows the annual administrative premium (PADM) and characteristics of the 
annual community-rated out-of-pocket-premiums (PCOM). From the table follows that the 
mean out-of-pocket premium charged by health plans was always higher than PADM. Although  
in the years 1997, 1998, and 2001-2004 at least one health plan charged a lower premium than 
PADM. Large fluctuations in PADM are due to changes in government policy. For example the 
government may decide to increase the size of the administrative premium and, as a result, has 
to transfer less money directly to health plans. In 1997 and 1998 PADM was considerably 
reduced by the introduction of a co-payment scheme, and subsequently increased after the 
abolition of this scheme in 1999. In our panel estimations PCOMi − PADM will be the 
dependent variable. The table shows that there is still a large variation in the mean of this 
variable. We included PDIF in the last row of table 3.2. We observe lower values and less 
variation in the last row of table 3.2. Lower values imply that the adjusted administrative 
premium was in every year, except in 2001, higher than the official administrative premium. 
Table 3.2  Administrative and community-rated out-of-pocket premiums 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                   
PADM : Annual administrative premium set by 



















                   
PCOMi : Annual out-of-pocket premium for 
compulsory insurance charged by health plan i  
(in euros) 
                 
Mean  156.0  98.2  98.1  179.0  189.6  163.6  182.6  344.7  304.6 
Standard Deviation    4.0  7.8  8.1  12.6  16.5  26.2  25.1  32.8  30.9 
Maximum     163.9  108.4  108.4  200.1  223.3  223.3  238.8  390.0  358.2 
Minimum   147.6  65.3  65.3  156.6  156.6  132.1  114.0  239.4  215.4 
Mean PCOMi  - PADM  35.0  27.2  27.1  45.0  48.6  16.6  27.6  87.7  82.6 
Mean PCOMi  - PADM  - PDIF  9.3  11.5  7.0  16.9  18.8  20.0  11.0  27.7  42.6   17 
3.2  Explanatory variables  
In section 2, we distinguished several factors that may explain health plans’ pricing behaviour. 
In the next subsections we describe how we measured each of these factors. 
3.2.1  Uncompensated medical expenses 
As discussed in section 3.1, by calculating the risk-adjusted capitation payments the 
government projects for each health plan its expected medical expenses for the next year. Of 
course, health plans may have higher or lower medical expenses than predicted by the 
government and may recover (expected) deficits/surpluses by charging a higher/lower out-of-
pocket premium. We define the variable uncompensated medical expenses as the difference 
between a health plan’s actual medical expenses (including retrospective compensation and 
equalisation payments) and the medical expenses predicted by the government.
7 Table 3.3 
presents some characteristics of the uncompensated medical expenses per adult enrolee 
(UMEX). The mean of UMEX indicates that on average, except 1997 and 2001, medical 
expenses were higher than the risk-adjusted capitation payments, especially in 2002 and 2003 
medical expenses turned out to be much higher than predicted by the government. 
Table 3.3  Uncompensated medical expenses  
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
                 
UMEXi : Annual medical expenses per adult 
enrolee not compensated by the general 
fund for health plans (in euros)                 
Mean   13.6  − 3.4  24.9  10.6  3.2  − 0.6  37.1  38.2 
Standard Deviation  9.4  21.3  17.8  18.7  45.5  43.9  33.9  40.0 
Minimum  − 9.9  − 4.9  − 2.4  − 4.5  − 116.6  − 124.8  − 66.3  − 98.7 
Maximum  28.0  25.5  46.0  40.4  98.1  62.8  78.4  76.1 
 
3.2.2  Administrative expenses 
The money that health plans directly receive from the government includes also a budget to 
cover administrative expenses. Table 3.4 shows the difference between the actual administrative 
expenses and the administrative budget per adult enrolee (ADMC). The table shows that for 
almost all health plans administrative expenses exceed the administrative budget determined by 
the government.
8 For some health plans the losses are for some years more than 100 euros per 
adult enrolee. Note that administrative expenses are less volatile, and therefore better 
 
7 Health plans do not bear full risk on medical expenses that are higher or lower than the risk adjusted payments as 
determined by the government. In the case of retrospective compensation the government bears some of the risk and in 
case of equalisation payments the risk is spread over all insurers (Douven 2004)  
8 Administrative expenses for carrying out long term care are included in the figures. Due to economies of scale the 
administrative budget per enrolee of large health plans were somewhat smaller than those of small health plans.    18 
predictable, than medical expenses since administrative expenses can generally be better 
controlled by health plans. 
The last row of table 3.4 indicates the mean gains or losses per adult enrolee that remain after 
subtracting all medical and administration expenses from the community-rated premium. The 
fluctuation in the overall financial results suggests that an underwriting cycle may be present. In 
three of the eight years we observe underwriting losses. Especially in 2001 and 2002 many 
insurers incurred a substantial loss. This was presumably partly caused by a profound change in 
hospital finance from global budgeting to an open-ended reimbursement. This change was 
introduced in 2001 by the government to reduce hospital waiting list and resulted in rapid 
hospital cost inflation. However, the last row in table 3.4 does not tell the whole story about 
insurers’ profitability, since health plans obtain additional revenues from returns on invested 
reserve capital. 
Table 3.4  Uncompensated administrative expenses  
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
                 
ADMCi : Annual administrative expenses per 
adult enrolee not compensated by the 
administrative budget  (in euros)                 
Mean  8.1  14.5  16.5  17.0  31.6  41.5  39.9  26.2 
Standard Deviation  12.8  13.9  15.9  16.0  35.3  26.1  28.3  28.9 
Maximum  46.9  46.2  57.3  53.2  165.1  98.9  133.6  129.9 
Minimum  − 2.8  0.2  − 0.5  1.9  5.6  4.8  8.8  − 11.8 
Mean PCOMi  - PADM - UMEXi - ADMCI  13.3  16.1  − 14.3  17.4  13.8  − 24.3  − 49.4  23.3 
 
3.2.3  Financial reserves 
Health plans are required by law to maintain a minimum level of financial reserves. The 
required solvency margin equals about 8% of the annual medical expenses for which the health 
plan is at risk.
9 As an indicator of a health plan’s wealth we use the freely available reserve 
capital (FRES), which are the financial reserves per adult enrolee minus the required solvency 
margin.
10 Table 3.5 reveals that the mean sharply decreased in 2002 and 2003. This was caused 
by losses incurred on medical and administrative expenses (see table 3.4) and by the crash in 
the stock market.
11 Table 3.5 also shows that in five years some health plans were in financial 
 
9 Part of the medical expenses (e.g. fixed hospital costs and individual costs exceeding a certain threshold) are largely 
retrospectively compensated or equalised. Since this proportion has been steadily reduced over time, health plans’ financial 
risk  increased from 13% in 1996 to about 53% in 2004 (Prinsze et al, 2005). Consequently the required solvency margin 
increased concurrently. 
10 The data of reserve capital in a certain year is surrounded with uncertainty because it may take several years before the 
books of that year can be closed. 
11 One important caveat of the data is that variables such as UMEX, ADMC, FRES and others are obtained from different 
data-sources and are constructed at different points in time. For example, data for FRES comes from the annual balance 
sheet of health plans and are already available before the final settlement of accounts for UMEX appear. Insurers therefore 
use estimated values of UMEX to complete the annual balance sheet. For our analysis this means that constructed variables 
such as  PCOMi  - PADM - UMEX i - ADMC i  should be seen as indicators and not as actual values.    19 
trouble since the minimum of FRES was below zero. In 2003, four health plans had to borrow 
money to meet the required solvency position. We expect that a health plan with FRES that is  
close to or even below zero will have to increase next year’s premium relative to its 
competitors. 
Since 2001, the law imposes also a maximum limit to the financial reserves of a health plan.
12 
As a rule of thumb one could say that the maximum level of reserves is equal to about 2,5 times 
the required minimum solvency margin. If a health plan’s financial reserves exceed the 
maximum limit it has to return the surplus to the government or has to reduce its out-of-pocket 
premium. For a health plan, the latter strategy is of course more attractive. In our panel we use 
the variable RRES, which is the residual reserve capital per adult enrolee that a health plan can 
accumulate before the maximum margin is reached. Although the maximum limit to financial 
reserves was imposed in 2001, health plans may well have anticipated to this regulation in the 
preceding year. Therefore, in our panel we chose 2000 as starting year. We expect that if a 
health plan’s RRES is close to zero – implying that its financial reserves approach the maximum 
limit – it will reduce next year’s premium relative to its competitors. Table 3.5 shows that RRES 
increases over time, but that there is a large variation among health plans. Each year some 
health plans are close to the maximum limit. 
Table 3.5  Financial reserve position of health plans (euros, per adult enrolee) 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
                 
FRESi : Freely available reserve 
capital per adult enrolee (net of 
the required solvency margin) 
for health plan i (in euros)   
 
             
Mean  64.9  79.9  55.3  65.6  81.1  77.3  49.1  44.8 
Standard Deviation   41.0  71.1  43.1  56.7  61.9  62.7  58.3  54.0 
Maximum    191.2  362.5  134.8  159.4  218.6  239.1  177.2  177.7 
Minimum    4.8  7.1  − 31.2  − 47.4  − 36.4  1.2  − 38.1  − 27.8 
                 
RRESi : residual reserve capital 
per adult enrolee that can be 
accumulated until the maximum 
limit is reached, for health plan i 
(in euros)    
 
             
Mean           101.2  132.6  175.3  197.6 
Standard Deviation           108.1  100.9  97.0  109.6 
Maximum          376.6  358.1  391.8  480.0 
Minimum            − 49.2  12.2  − 7.0  − 12.4 
 
 
12 Not all financial reserves fall under the scope of this regulation.   20 
3.2.4  Competition 
We discern three variables to examine the role of competition in health plans’ pricing decisions.  
First, as explained in section 2, health plans may be particularly sensitive to the pricing 
behaviour of its geographically closest competitors because enrolees tend to look primarily at 
the most well known regional health plans. We first defined for each health plan a set of its 
regionally closest competitors. Then we constructed for each health plan a variable that 
indicates whether the health plan charged a relatively low or high premium compared to its 
closest competitors. This variable can be constructed in a number of ways; one could compare 
the health plans premium with the average (or minimum) premium of its competitors or with 
the average (or minimum) premium of all health plans in the market. We will report the 
outcomes for these variables in our paper qualitatively. In our estimations in the paper we will 
report the results of a dummy variable. This dummy variable, PCOMP, is one if in a certain 
year the premium of this health plan is higher than the average premium of its competitors, and 
zero otherwise. In Appendix A we present the table for each health plan and, as we constructed 
them, their main competitors. 
Second, we examine the sensitivity of health plans to a loss of market share. If premium 
competition plays a role then we expect that health plans that lose market share are more willing 
to reduce premiums to regain it. We measure the change of market share by the annual change 
in the number of adult enrolees per health plan (GPEE). Table 3.6 shows a large and skewed 
variation in GPEE, which can be explained by mergers and by the presence of a number of very 
small health plans that can easily double their enrolment.  
Table 3.6  Market share and annual growth rate of health plans 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
                 
MSHAi : Market share of health plan i  
(in %) 
 
             
Mean  4.17  4.17  4.35  4.35  4.00  4.17  4.76  4.76 
Standard Deviation   2.99  3.00  3.24  3.24  3.58  3.58  4.57  4.53 
Maximum    11.79  12.15  12.29  12.40  12.31  12.56  15.12  14.77 
Minimum    0.11  0.13  0.15  0.18  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.19 
                 
GPEEi : Annual growth rate of the number 
of adult enrolees of health plan i  (in %)  
 
             
Mean   5.0  5.3  5.5  1.9  8.1  5.4  2.0  10.4 
Standard Deviation   12.3  10.5  18.5  3.8  20.5  12.1  8.6  37.6 
Maximum  49.7  38.5  86.4  15.7  95.1  47.4  32.3  168.9 
Minimum    − 3.6  − 3.0  − 1.9  − 1.6  − 3.9  − 3.3  − 5.2  − 4.2 
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A third variable we distinguish is the market share of a health plan (MSHA), which is defined as 
the number of enrolees divided by the total number of enrolees. Large health plans may have 
competitive advantages due to economies of scale in administration, in purchasing care or in 
reducing insurance risk. Therefore, large health plans may be inclined to charge lower 
premiums. Of course in a competitive market this strategy is only sensible if consumers are  
sufficiently price sensitive. On the other hand large health plans may have more market power, 
which may enable them to set higher prices. Thus we expect the market share variable to be 
negatively related to premium if price competition is effective, and a positive relation when 
price competition is not effective. Table 3.6 shows that the largest health plan has a market 
share of more than 10% of the market and the smallest health plan a market share of about 0.1% 
of the market. 
3.2.5  Supplementary insurance premiums  
As explained in section 2, pricing decisions by health plans for basic insurance may be 
influenced by pricing of supplementary insurance since these products are closely linked and 
some cross subsidisation is possible through the allocation of administrative expenses. If 
customers are more sensitive to the price of supplementary coverage, health plans might be 
willing to reduce supplementary insurance premiums at the expense of basic insurance 
premiums (by shifting administrative expenses to the basic insurance scheme) or vice versa. If 
cross-subsidisation is important, we expect that supplementary health insurance premiums are 
inversely related to basic insurance premiums (all other things equal). 
Data on supplementary coverage and premiums were derived from a commercial database 
for insurance agents (ROLLS), supplemented with information obtained directly from a number 
of health plans which were not included in that database (or not during the entire period). From 
2002 onwards data is obtained from a website that compares premiums and the extent of 
coverage for a broad range of insurance products, including health insurance 
(www.independer.nl). Most health plans offer a choice between three or four, and some even 
more, different supplementary benefit packages. 
Premiums of the various supplementary benefit packages are highly correlated. For the 
empirical analysis we used premiums charged for the most popular supplementary benefits 
package (PSUP), including at least regular dental care and prolonged physiotherapy. A 
cautionary note here is that supplementary benefits packages are not identical but vary across 
health plans. Hence the observed premium variation might be partly explained by variation in 
coverage. Although health plans are allowed to risk rate, most of them still charge community-
rated premiums for supplementary coverage and almost all health plans do not charge premiums 
for children under the age of 18. Table 3.7 shows that supplementary premiums have increased 
substantially over time. The large increase in 2004 can be largely explained by a reduction of 
the mandatory basic benefit package and the concurrent expansion of supplementary insurance 
coverage.   22 
Table 3.7  Premiums for supplementary insurance  
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                   
PSUPi : Annual premiums for supplementary 
insurance charged by health plan i (in euros)                   
Mean   59.7  64.3  66.8  74.5  83.4  89.0  105.5  116.0  172.5 
Standard Deviation    21.5  22.0  21.7  18.4  26.7  29.6  23.0  32.7  46.8 
Maximum     98.0  98.0  108.0  117.1  179.7  196.0  186.0  204.0  288.0 
Minimum   27.2  27.2  27.2  39.5  49.8  54.2  67.2  69.6  99.0 
 
3.2.6  Health-plan objectives 
As explained in section 2, health plans may differ in the goals they pursue, which may result in 
differences in pricing behaviour for different types of health plans. In our panel estimations we 
will distinguish among four types of health plans that may pursue different goals (see appendix 
A for more detailed information). The first types are small independent regionally based health 
plans that propagate their adherence to “social objectives”. These health plans might not be 
interested to engage in price competition to gain market share. Second types are large 
traditional health plans that operate mainly nationally. These health plans might be more 
interested in gaining market share than in making profits. The third category we discern consists 
of health plans that are part of a large multi-line insurance company. We expect that these 
health plans might be less willing to sacrifice profitability for gaining market share and thus 
may charge relatively high premiums. Finally, we identify new entrants, since they are expected 
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4  Panel data estimations  
4.1  Five different estimation models 
We apply five different types of (unbalanced) panel data models for explaining the dependent 
variable PCOMi − PADM. Since health plan have to set next year’s premium at the end of the 
current year, we use one year lagged explanatory variables  in our panel data estimations. The 
first model (Model A) is the fixed (period and cross section) effects model. In this model both 8 
year and 27 health plan dummies are included in the estimation model. The year dummy 
captures time-effects that are constant for all individual health plans. The fund dummies capture 
individual health plans effects that are constant over time. It should be noted that the year 
dummies eliminate any cross-section invariant variables, such as PDIF, from the model. In the 
second model (Model B) we apply only the fixed fund effects and therefore can include PDIF 
in our estimations. In model C we substitute random fund effects for the fixed fund effects in 
model B. In model D we replace the random fund effects of model C by four fixed group 
effects, each group representing different types of health plans. Finally, in model E we ignore 
all fund and period effects and run a pooled OLS-regression with only one constant. The idea 
behind these five estimation models is not to obtain the “correct” model but to show possible 
effects of the explanatory variables. The “true” effect of an explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable is difficult to measure when it is correlated with the fixed or random effects. 
The five models present therefore for each explanatory variable a range of possible effects.  
4.2  Constructing explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables are in some cases split up into parts. For example UMEX is split up in 
UMEX 
+, positive values of UMEX and negative values are set to zero, and UMEX 
¯, negative 
values of UMEX and positive values are set to zero.
13 The idea behind this split up is that health 
plans may respond different to gains and losses.  
Since FRES and RRES are strongly (negatively) correlated we assign a health plan uniquely 
to one of the following three reserve capital groups: FRES 
<50, FRES 
>50 or RRES 
<50. Our 
hypothesis is that health plans that are close to the required solvency margin, or close to the 
maximum margin, are likely to respond differently when setting their out-of-pocket premium 
than health plans that are safely away from both margins. We constructed for health plans close 
to the required solvency margin a group FRES 
<50, which equals FRES for observations lower 
than 50 euro. Similarly, for health plans close to the maximum margin we constructed the group 
RRES 
<50 which equals RRES for all values smaller than 50 euros. Finally, FRES 
>50 contains all 
 
13 This procedure is not followed for ADMC since almost all values of ADMC are positive (see table 3.4).   24 
other health plans that are not assigned to the other two groups.
14 The cut off point of 50 euros 
is rather arbitrary, but we will report results of other cut off points as well.  
For GPEE, the annual growth rate of the number of adult enrolees of a health plan, we will 
use only negative values (and set the positive values to zero). The hypothesis is that health plan 
with negative growth rates might charge a lower premium in the next year in order to attract 
new customers. This variable is named GPEE¯. 
In estimation model D we grouped health plans by distinguishing four different types of 
health plans: health plan that are part of a larger concern, health plan that operate mainly 
nationally or regionally and new (relatively small) health plans that entered the market during 
the sample period (see Appendix A). 
Finally, in model D and E we left out four explanatory variables. The reason is twofold. 
First of all the sign of these variables in model A, B and C indicated that there was no reason of 
a causality but only of a (insignificant) correlation. Second, some values of the explanatory 
values were missing and leaving them out increased our number of observations with 11.  
4.3  Estimation results 
Table 4.1 summarises the results. First of all we find positive values for UMEX 
+(−1). The 
estimated coefficients in models A to E imply that a health plan that lost money on medical 
expenses charged for every lost euro between 0.15-0.59 euro higher premium next year. The 
values are lower than one implying that not all uncompensated medical expenses of the 
previous year feed through to the premium. The positive coefficient of UMEX 
+(−1) increases 
from estimation model A to E, suggesting that UMEX 
+(−1) is positively correlated with the 
fixed effects in model A, B and D, and with the random effects in model C. A likely reason may 
be that imperfect risk adjustment leads to structural differences in uncompensated medical 
expenses across health plans. These structural differences maintain over the years and are partly  
captured by the fixed or random cross-section effects.
15 We observe a similar pattern for  
UMEX 
¯(-1), but we find coefficients ranging from −0.04 and 0.18, which turn out to be lower  
than the estimated coefficients for UMEX 
+(−1). This suggests that health plans react 
asymmetrical to gains and losses and those losses feed through to the premium faster than 
gains.
16 The estimated coefficients for ADMC(−1), ranging from 0.03 - 0.36, imply that  
 
 
14 Technically FRES 
<50 (RRES 
<50) equals FRES
 (RRES) for observations lower than 50 euros and equals 50 euros for all 
other observations. Finally, FRES 
>50 is equal to FRES− 50 and zero for all health plans belonging to the other two groups. 
15 In Douven (2004) it is also shown that during the period 1993-2001 structural differences across health plans exist. 
16 Coefficient tests reject (at a 5% level) in all five models the hypothesis that the coefficient of UMEX 
+
(-1) equals the 
coefficient of UMEX ¯  (-1).    25 
Table 4.1           Estimation results of PCOMi -PADM  for 1996-2004 (standard errors in parentheses, * indicates 
that estimators are significant at a 5% level). 
Dependent variable: 
PCOMi  -PADM 
         
              Estimation Method                     
  Model A:  Model B:  Model C:  Model D:  Model E: 
           
Model  Panel effects: 
fixed period, 
fixed fund 
Panel effects:   
no period,     
fixed fund 
Panel effects:   
no period, 
random fund 
Panel effects:   
no period, fixed 
grouping funds 
Panel effects:   
no period,        
no fund      
Estimation  OLS  OLS  EGLS  OLS  OLS 
           
Explanatory variables           
Constant  30.0  2.9  − 2.1  ─  6.6 
  (15.0)  (11.1)  (7.5)    (6.2) 
UMEXi 
+
(-1)  0.15  0.28*  0.40*  0.56*  0.59* 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
UMEXi ¯ (-1)
  − 0.04  0.04  0.13  0.03  0.18* 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
ADMCi (-1)  0.10  0.03  0.17*  0.36*  0.30* 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
RRESi 
<50(-1)  0.39*  0.27*  0.25*  0.10  0.18 
  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
FRESi 
<50(-1)  − 0.40*  − 0.43*  − 0.31*  − 0.35*  − 0.22* 
  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
FRESi 
>50(-1)  − 0.06  − 0.03  − 0.03  − 0.03  − 0.05 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
GPEEi (-1)¯   0.19  0.9  − 0.9  ─  ─ 
  (1.58)  (1.5)  (1.3)     
PCOMPi (-1)  5.2  4.8  7.2*  ─  ─ 
  (2.8)  (2.7)  (2.6)     
PSUPi   1.5  2.9*  1.4*  ─  ─ 
  (1.3)  (0.6)  (0.5)     
MSHAi (-1)  − 1.8  − 1.5  0.2  ─  ─ 
  (2.1)  (2.1)  (0.6)     
PDIF  ─  0.79*  0.77*  0.85*  0.80* 
    (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
New fund dummy  ─  ─  ─  − 8.2  ─ 
        (7.0)   
Regional fund dummy  ─  ─  ─  15.4*  ─ 
        (6.3)   
Concern fund dummy  ─  ─  ─  9.3  ─ 
        (6.7)   
National fund dummy  ─  ─  ─  14.4*  ─ 
        (6.6)   
           
R
2  0.895  0.885  0.797  0.759  0.735 
Adjusted R
2  0.858  0.852  0.782  0.744  0.724 
Durbin-Watson  1.75  1.85  1.49  1.25  1.17 
Number of observations  164  164  164  175  175 
Cross-sections included  27  27  27  28  28 
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administrative expenses are not yearly passed on fully to the premium. The low coefficients, 
however, may partly be explained by our bias in measuring administrative expenses since, as 
we explained in section 2, health plans can easily shift administrative expenses from basic to 
supplementary and long term care insurance. The increasing coefficients from model A to 
model E suggests that ADMC(−1) is also correlated with the fixed and random effects. 
High coefficients for medical and administrative expenses suggest that health plans react 
very strong on yearly cyclical fluctuations, while low coefficients would indicate that health 
plans are not able or willing to translate higher cost into higher premiums. This could mean that 
competition is effectively constraining premiums and may force health plans to reduce costs in 
the long run.  
Our findings suggest that a sound solvency position is an  important long term health plan 
objective. We find significant (on a 5% level) negative coefficients for FRES 
<50(−1) in all five 
estimation models implying that health plans with a critical solvency position charge higher 
premiums to retain a sound solvency position. For example, a health plan with a solvency 
position equal to the required solvency margin sets premiums about 10-20 euros higher than 
health plans without a critical solvency position. We also find that health plans with a reserve 
capital close to the maximum margin charge lower premiums than health plans with a larger 
distance to the maximum margin. A health plan at the maximum of its reserves charges about  
5-20 euros lower premiums. As one would expect, health plans close to the maximum margin 
prefer to return the excess of capital to the insured, instead of returning it to the government. In 
all five models, health plans with a sound solvency position charge somewhat lower premiums, 
although the effects are small and not significant.
17 
Since the coefficient of GPEEi (−1)¯  is not significant in any of the three models (and even 
changes sign) we conclude that we have to reject our hypothesis that health plans losing 
enrolees charge lower premiums in the following year. This does however not mean that no 
health plan follows this strategy. The positive sign in model A and B may indicate that some 
health plans charge lower their premium after loosing enrolees while others do not. 
The estimated coefficients of the premium for the closest competitors (PCOMP) show that 
health  plans charging higher premiums than their competitors do not charge lower premiums in 
the following year. On the contrary, we find that most health plans charging a higher premium 
than their competitors do so every year.
18 This result is in line with a relatively high and 
positive Spearman correlation coefficient for nominal premiums.
19 
The positive and sometimes significant coefficient for PSUP implies that we find no 
evidence for cross subsidisation with supplementary premiums. We therefore reject our 
hypothesis that health plans with low nominal premiums for the basic benefit package charge 
 
17 Changing our cut-off point of 50 euros to 25 euros or 75 euros yielded similar results but with lower R
2’s 
18 We found the same result for other constructions of competitiveness variables. 
19 See also Van Dijk et al. (2006).   27 
(to recover potential losses on the nominal premium) higher premiums (than average) for the 
supplementary package.  
Interestingly enough, the difference between the official and adjusted administrative 
premium (based on the insurers’ association forecast) PDIF, seems to play an important role. 
We find a coefficient close to one in all four estimation models B, C, D and E. This suggests 
that health plans incorporate the mark-up (on top of the administrative premium calculated by 
the government) of the insurers’ association forecast almost fully when setting their own 
nominal premium.  
Finally, we find in model D that new funds charged on average about 20 euros lower 
premiums than health plans that operated already on the market before 1996.
20 New health 
plans could follow such a price strategy because their medical expenses were much lower than 
of the incumbent health plans.
21  
 
Our results show that the explanatory variables are correlated with the individual fixed health 
plan effects. Using model selection criteria, such as the adjusted R
2 or Akaike’s information 
criteria, however give only slightly higher values for model A than for model B, while the 
values are substantially higher than for model C, D and E. On the other hand, because of this 
correlation the “true” effects of UMEX and ADMC may not be adequate in model A and B but 
may be better captured by model D and E. At least economic intuition would suggest certain 
causality between UMEX and ADMC and premiums.  
We performed sensitivity and robustness analysis by constructing other type of variables, 
considering different time periods and different type of estimators. This sensitivity analysis, of 
course, yielded different estimators but they never changed drastically. We believe that our 












20 We tested the hypothesis that the coefficient for the new fund dummy (8.2) equals the coefficient for the regional (15.4), 
concern (9.3) or national fund dummy (14.4). In all three cases these hypothesis are rejected at a 5% level. 
21 These large differences in medical expenses were partly caused by inadequacies in the risk adjustment system. For 
example, in the year 2000 the privately insured lower-income self employed were legally obliged to obtain social health 
insurance coverage and most self employed opted for the cheaper new health plans (Schut et al. 2003). Self employed 
appeared to have much lower medical expenses than average and therefore an indicator of being self-employed or not was 
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5  Discussion  
From the previous section, two issues are particularly important and warrant further discussion.  
First, we will discuss the role of competition in health plans’ pricing decisions. Next, we will 
expand on the role of the premium forecast by the insurers association on health plans’ pricing 
behaviour.  
5.1  The role of competition 
Our empirical results indicate that competition did not play a major role in premium setting by 
health plans. First, health plans did not respond to a loss of enrolees by reducing their premiums 
relative to those of their competitors.  Next, premium differences among closest competitors 
were quite stable over time. Third, health plans with higher costs were able to translate a 
substantial part of these costs into higher premiums while health plans with profitable medical 
expenses were more reluctant to pass these on to their premiums. In fact, the most important 
drivers for health plans’ pricing behaviour were the legally specified minimum and maximum 
levels of financial reserves. Health plans just above the minimum solvency margin were 
significantly more likely to raise their relative premiums, while health plans close to the 
maximum ceiling were significantly more likely to reduce their relative premiums. The limited 
role of competition in pricing behaviour is consistent with the low price elasticity of health plan 
choice, as observed by several studies as mentioned in section two.
22 Apparently, consumers are 
not sufficiently price sensitive to constrain health plans’ pricing behaviour. 
If premiums are not effectively constrained by competition, one would expect that all health 
plans – except those being close to the maximum reserve limit - would charge high premiums 
and would make huge profits. Instead of all premiums tending towards a monopoly level, we 
observe substantial and persistent premium variation, while until 2002 the average premiums 
did not deviate strongly from the administrative premium (see Figure 5.1). This suggests that 
not all health plans act as profit maximisers and that the legal prohibition of for-profit goals 
might have had a mitigating effect on health insurance premiums. Thus “social objectives” or 
objectives such as gaining market share may have played a role as well. The latter objective 
would be consistent with our finding that entrants charged significant lower premiums than the 
incumbents. These lower premiums may have had a mitigating effect on the premiums of the 
incumbents.
23 
Moreover, rather than substantial profits we observe that health plans incurred substantial 
losses in medical expenses in 2001 and 2002, resulting in decreasing financial reserves. The 
most likely explanation for this observation is, however, that all health plans severely 
 
22 These studies report price elasticity’s until 2001. A recent survey shows that the proportion of enrolees switching health 
plans is slightly but steadily increasing from 2001 to 2005 (Laske-Aldershof and Schut 2005). 
23 Unfortunately we do not have information about the time of announcement of premiums in each year. The premium(s) of 
the health plan(s) that first announce(s) their premium(s) may be used as benchmark by other health plans.   30 
underestimated the escalation of medical expenses due to the relaxation of the budgetary 
restrictions by the government. In addition health plans did not anticipate the crash of the stock 
market that reduced their financial reserves. This may also explain why all health plans 
substantially raised their premiums (in comparison with the administrative premium) in 2003, 
2004 and 2005 (see figure 5.1). 



















5.2  The role of the insurers association’s forecasts 
The considerable uncertainty about health care cost inflation, may also explain why we find an 
important impact of the forecast of total health care expenditures by the insurers’ association on 
health plans’ pricing behaviour. Figure 5.2 compares next year’s forecast of total medical 
expenses by the government and by the insurers association with the realised expenditures 
(which are scaled to zero). In all years except 2001 the government forecasts of total medical 
expenses were too low (probably because the government tends to overestimate the effects of 
policy measures to reduce health care expenditure growth), with the largest gaps in 2002 and 
2003 (about 50 euro per adult enrolee). The insurers association projected higher forecasts 
which proved to be more accurate (according to usual forecast criteria) but often exceeded 
actual expenditure growth. According to our panel estimations, health plans seem to follow the 
insurers association forecast quite closely. This corroborates our finding that health plan pricing 
 
24 For 2006, we have used premiums for individual and collective contracts in the figure. Furthermore, we have estimated 
the impact of administrative expenses in the administrative premium since health plans no longer receive budgets for their 
administrative expenses in 2006.    31 
behaviour is much more influenced by safeguarding a sound financial position than by price 
competition. 
The price signals by the insurers association may reduce uncertainty and forecasting errors 
by individual health plans and thus may enhance financial stability. For 2002, however, both the 
government and the insurers association, produced substantial forecast errors. These errors not 
only have reinforced the underwriting cycle but health plans may also have anticipated on 
possible forecast errors by charging higher premiums in subsequent years (see figure 5.1).   
Price signals may also facilitate tacit collusion, since they make implicit price agreements 
much easier.
25 This may particularly be so if competitive pressure is low, as appears to be the 
case in the Dutch social health insurance market. 
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6  The impact of the new health insurance system 
In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system has been profoundly reformed. The new mandatory 
national health insurance scheme permits any non-profit or for-profit health insurer meeting 
certain standards to offer basic health insurance coverage. Hence, the former distinction 
between social and private health plans has been abolished. Consumers pay for on average 50 
percent of the cost of basic insurance by a community-rated premium that has to be determined 
by health insurers. In 2005 the government estimated that the average community rated 
premium would have to be about 1100 euro per adult enrolee in 2006 (children until 18 years of 
age are “free”). Low-income groups will receive a subsidy if the average community rated 
premium charged by the health insurers exceeds a certain proportion (e.g. 4% for single adults) 
of their actual or a legally determined threshold income (e.g. in case no income is earned). The 
other 50% of the cost of basic health insurance is financed by income related contributions from 
employers, pensioners and the self-employed. Health insurers can compete for customers by 
offering lower flat rate premiums and by different preferred provider arrangements and HMO’s. 
Consumers can switch insurers at annual open enrolment periods and a prospective risk 
adjustment scheme will compensate health insurers for enrolling predictably high-risk 
individuals (these risk-adjusted compensations are paid out of the health insurance fund that is 
filled with the income related contributions).  Health insurers are allowed to offer premium 
discounts for group contracts (up to 10 percent of a similar individual contract) and for people 
who opt for a voluntary deductible that may vary between 100 and 500 euro per year (in 
discrete steps of 100 euro). These deductibles are on top of a mandatory no claim rebate of 255 
euro per year for the entire population. 
Both former social health plans’ enrolees and the former privately insured were obliged to 
choose a new health insurance contract for basic insurance and could opt for supplementary 
insurance.  However, people who did not make a choice before March 2006 are automatically 
covered for the same benefits by the same health insurers as in 2005. Nevertheless, for all Dutch 
citizens in 2006 the choice setting radically changed and by the end of 2005 it was widely 
expected that many customers would reconsider their choice of health plan (Deloitte 2005). 
Indeed, two recent surveys among about 600 and 1070 respondents conducted in January 2006 
show that already 9-10 percent of the people had switched to another health plan and another 
25-40 percent were considering to do so (TNS NIPO 2006a, Delnoij et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
half of these respondents mentioned price as the most important reason for (considering) 
switching. At the end of February 2006, a following survey among 600 respondents indicated 
that about 25 percent of the people had switched to another health plan (TNS NIPO 2006b). 
The threat of a substantial loss of customers seems to have had a profound impact on health 
plans’ pricing behaviour. As shown in Figure 5.1, in 2006 for the first time health insurers 
charged lower premiums for individual contracts than the administrative premium calculated by 
the government. Anticipating that many customers would reconsider their health plan choice,   34 
most health insurers appear to have set their premium as low as possible. Another plausible 
reason for undercutting the administrative premium is that in 2006 the government decided to 
take away the risk that the administrative premium was set too low.
26 In addition, the health 
plan that first announced its premium for 2006 (the “first mover”) did so much earlier than in 
previous years and got much more media exposure. This might well have contributed to more 
intense price competition because it triggered other health plans to follow soon and to undercut 
the first mover’s premium. Furthermore, several health plans offered large premium discounts 
(up to 10% or about 100 euro per individual per year) for group contracts. These group 
contracts were not only employment-based but were offered also to other groups, sometimes 
with a large number of potential insured such as the major labour unions (in total about 1,5 
million members), the national sport federation (in total about 1,5 million members), and a large 
cooperative bank (in total about 1,5 million members). Group contracts were even offered to  
interest associations for the elderly and several specific groups of chronic patients (e.g. diabetes 
and rheumatoid arthritis).
27  For almost all group contracts premiums are set far below the 
administrative premium forecast, which is supposed by the government to be the break-even 
price. Since most individual premiums are below this break-even premium, insurers cannot 
compensate the expected losses on group contracts by cross-subsidisation from individual 
contracts. Thus losses have to be financed out of the financial reserves.
28 The health insurers 
association already warned in the press that most health plans would incur substantial losses in 
2006, which could result in an 18 percent premium increase in 2007 (Bassant 2005, NRC 
Handelsblad, January 4, 2006).  
Thus, in sharp contrast to the period 1996-2005, competition seems to play a dominant role 
in pricing decisions by health insurers in 2006.
29 An important question is whether this is a 
temporary effect due to the shock effect of the profound health insurance reform or whether 
competition will have a lasting impact on health plan pricing behaviour.  
On the one hand, several factors can be distinguished that may enhance a future role of 
competition. First, the 2006 health insurance reform increased the awareness among the 
 
26 The administrative premium in 2006 is estimated according to the rules of the social health insurance system. Since the 
risk adjustment system had to be extended to the former private health insurers, the accuracy of the system could not be 
fully guaranteed (Douven 2005). Therefore, the government has decided to fully retrospectively compensate health plans’ 
risk-adjusted budgets for a possible wrong prediction of total medical expenses. Furthermore, the government has decided 
to compensate 90 percent of a more than 35 euro deviation between the actual and compensated medical expenses per 
enrolee in 2006. This implies that health plans did not have to take into account the possibility of a wrong forecast by the 
government and can use the focal point of the government as a correct starting point for premium setting. This also explains 
why the forecast of the insurers’ association for total health care expenditures became irrelevant for premium setting in 
2006. This aspect, as well as the decrease in health plans’ individual risk, increases certainty (or reduces risk) in health 
plans’ premium calculations and is therefore likely to reduce the level as well as the variation of premiums. 
27 Group contracts with high-risk groups such as elderly and patients with several chronic diseases are feasible because 
insurers are compensated for these risks by the risk-adjustment scheme. 
28 Former private health insurers have substantial financial reserves because the required solvency margin was reduced 
from 24 percent of total premiums in 2005 to less than 8 percent in 2006.  
29 Contrary to what might be expected, competition did not result in a lower premium variation (measured by the variance) 
than in previous years. A plausible explanation for this is that the unequal distribution of financial reserves enabled several 
health insurers to charge premiums substantially below the break-even price.    35 
population of the possibility to switch health plans. Second, group contracts are likely to play a 
much larger role
30 and these groups are likely to be much more price sensitive than individual 
buyers. Third, the increased possibilities for health plans to manage care may intensify efforts to 
improve the efficiency of care delivery. Fourth, the entry of former private for-profit insurers 
may have an important spill-over effect on the behaviour of non-profit health insurers.
31 Non-
profit health plans might be forced to follow potentially more aggressive pricing strategies and 
cost reduction efforts by for profit health plans. Fifth, reliable consumer information about 
premiums and performance of health plans is steadily improving and easier accessible, which 
may enhance effective consumer search. Finally, there may be an income effect. Since for 
former social health plan enrolees the community-rated premiums were raised from about 400 
to 1100 euro per year, the impact of these premiums on their budget substantially increased, 
which might induce them to search for lower premiums.   
On the other hand, other factors can be discerned that may reduce future competition. First, 
increasing policy differentiation in basic and supplementary insurance may increase search cost. 
Empirical and experimental studies show that more choice and greater complexity of choice 
after a certain point will inhibit action and reduce the quality of choices that are made (Frank 
and Lamirand 2005). Second, health plans may increasingly practice selective underwriting for 
supplementary health insurance, since supplementary coverage is likely to expand and making 
profit is likely to become more important. Selective underwriting for supplementary insurance 
is likely to discourage consumers to switch health plans because consumers clearly prefer to 
buy both basic and supplementary insurance from the same health plan.  Finally, the increase in 
community rated premiums (in comparison with the social health insurance market before 
2006) may lead to smaller differences in relative premiums between health plans.  This may 
reduce consumer price sensitivity and the incentives for health plans to compete on price. 
Economic psychological experiments demonstrate that consumers are quite sensitive to relative 
price reductions (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) which is corroborated by a choice experiment 






30 Before 2006, group contracts played a minor role in social health insurance. Group contracts were not allowed for basic 
insurance (the mandatory sickness fund scheme) and in the supplementary health insurance market only 14 percent of the 
enrolees had a group contract. In 2005 about 55% of the insured in the private indemnity insurance market had a group 
contract (VEKTIS, 2005). The vast majority of these group contracts were employment based. 
31 Former sickness funds have to remain non-profit for a period ten years if they want to keep the financial reserves that 
were accumulated before the reform (since these reserves are considered to be “public money”). If they convert to a for-
profit status within a period of ten years after the introduction of the Health Insurance Act (2006) they will have to return 
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7  Conclusion 
We estimated a premium model to determine which factors explain the price setting behaviour 
of health plans in the Dutch social health insurance scheme during the period 1996-2004. Our 
empirical results indicate that competition did not play a major role in premium setting by 
health plans. Despite the lack of effective competition, premiums do not converge towards the 
monopoly level. Instead, we observe a substantial and persistent premium variation, while in 
most years the average premium is only somewhat higher than the “administrative premium” as 
yearly set by the government. The administrative premium is about the break-even price for an 
average health plan if the government’s forecast of total health care and administrative 
expenditures is correct. The most important drivers for health plans’ pricing behaviour appeared 
to be the legally specified minimum and maximum levels of financial reserves. The forecast of 
next year’s health care expenditure by the government and the adjusted forecast by the insurers’ 
association play a major role in health plans’ pricing decisions. This also supports the 
supposition that health plan pricing behaviour is much more influenced by safeguarding a sound 
financial position than by price competition. 
In 2006, all Dutch citizens were faced with a radical change in choice setting due to a major 
reform of the health insurance system. Health insurers expected that many customers would 
reconsider their health plan choice. The threat of a substantial loss of customers had a profound 
impact on health plans’ pricing behaviour and most health plans charged substantially lower  
premiums than forecasted by the government. The expectation that many customers would 
reconsider their health plan choice, appears to have triggered health plans to set their premium 
at the lowest possible level. In particular group contracts were offered below the break-even 
price at the expense of health plans’ financial reserves. Another plausible reason for 
undercutting the administrative premium is that in 2006 the government decided to take away 
the risk that the administrative premium was set too low.  
Thus, in sharp contrast to the period 1996-2005, competition seems to play a dominant role 
in pricing decisions by health insurers in 2006. Whether this will be a temporary or lasting 
phenomenon is hard to predict. We discerned several factors that are likely to enhance future 
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Appendix A 
In table A.1, we describe for each health plan its regional closest competitors as we constructed 
them. A regional competitor is set between brackets if it has merged. 
Table 7.1  Health plans and selected regional competitors 
Health plan  Selected regional competitors 
   
Unive  ZK Spaarneland (ZK Achmea), PWZ, Groene Land  
OHRA   Amicon, Anoz, Topzorg 
Anova  Zilveren Kruis 
ZAO   PWZ, Zorg & Zekerheid 
OZ   CZ groep, VGZ, Trias, ZK-Achmea 
DSW  ZK-Achmea, Azivo, Delta Lloyd 
Anoz  Groene Land, Amicon 
Agis  Zilveren Kruis, Groene Land, Amicon 
Salland   Groene Land, Amicon, Anoz (Agis) 
NZC  ZAO 
Topzorg  Amicon, Ohra 
Pro-Life   Anova, ZK Achmea 
Stad Rotterdam  Achmea, DSW, OZ 
ONVZ                                                               Zorg & Zekerheid, Agis 
Anderzorg  Geove 
OZB  Amicon, Groene Land  
Nederzorg  Agis 
Trias  OZ, Zilveren Kruis, VGZ, Agis 
Nuts   Azivo, DSW 
Azivo                 Nuts, DSW 
ZK Spaarneland                    Unive, PWZ, Zorg & Zekerheid 
ZK Noordwijk  Unive, Zorg & Zekerheid 
Geove  Anderzorg, Groene Land 
ZON  Groene Land, Salland 
PWZ  Unive, ZK Achmea (ZK Spaarneland), Agis 
De Friesland   Anoz (Agis), Groene Land 
Zorg & Zekerheid  Agis, Trias 
Groene Land   Amicon, Anoz (Agis), Geove, De Friesland 
VGZ  CZ, OZ, Zilveren Kruis, Amicon 
ZK Achmea  DSW, OZ, CZ 
CZ groep  OZ, VGZ, Zilveren Kruis 
Amicon  Anoz (Agis), Groene Land, VGZ 
 
In table A.2, we grouped health plans by distinguishing four different types of health plans: 
health plan that are part of a larger concern (i.e. health plans that deliver other type of indemnity 
insurance), health plan that operate mainly nationally or regionally and new (relatively small) 
health plans that entered the market during the sample period.   42 
Table 7.2  Type of health plan 
Type of health plan  Health plan 
   
Regional health plan 
 
Amicon (before 2000), Anova, ANOZ, Azivo, De Friesland, DSW, Salland,  Topzorg, Trias,  
ZAO, ZK Spaarneland, ZK Noordwijk, Zorg & Zekerheid,  
National health plan  Agis, Amicon (after 2000) CZ-groep, Geove, OZ, Unive, VGZ, ZON. 
New entrant  Anderzorg, Nederzorg, ONVZ, OZB, Stad Rotterdam. 
Concern  Het Groene Land, Nuts, OHRA (Delta Lloyd-OHRA concern), PWZ, ZK Achmea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 